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Non-technical summary
An increasing number of empirical studies suggests that an individual’s work
experience is not fully represented by the number of years in employment
because career interruptions may have far-reaching consequences and are not
appropriately accounted for in the raw sum. Beyond mere stagnation, human
capital may decay during an interruption because of technical and organizational
progress or due to the fact that the employee’s knowledge is not maintained and
brushed up during absence. As human capital accumulated on the job is one of
the main determinants of an individual’s wage rate, wages are likely to be
affected by employment breaks. Furthermore, little is known about the wage
effects of different types of interruptions such as unemployment, parental leave,
additional home time or further education activities. The aim of our paper is to
shed light on the long-run wage effects of this variety of career breaks.
For this purpose we consider the timing and duration of non-employment spells
for 17 to 40 year old German women and men. We exploit an administrative
data set of German social security accounts (IAB employment sample)
supplemented with information on the employees’ entire working lives (IAB
supplement sample I). These data allow us to distinguish between employment
breaks due to registered unemployment, formal parental leave, training or other
reasons – a distinction which can only be approximated using just the IAB
employment sample.
The results show that, for both men and women, job experience accumulated
many years ago contributes less to the current income level than recent
employment spells. Allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity and
endogeneity of the work history results in lower estimated returns to experience,
particularly for women. Furthermore, the wage penalties of discontinuous
employment biographies are very different, in sign and in size, for women and
men. While men’s wages seem to be negatively affected by unemployment and
out-of-the-labor-force periods, wage cuts for women are mainly triggered by
parental leave and additional home time, even if taken place several years ago. It
is interesting to note that unemployed women experience lower wage cuts than
those staying out of the labor force for a while. Training, on the contrary,
generates positive wage effects for both sexes. A nice by-product of our
estimation procedure is that it allows us to disentangle the overall wage cut into
two components, the missing experience effect and an additional productivity-
related effect, possibly caused by signaling or a stigma imposed by the
employer. Wage cuts exceeding the missing experience effect seem to concern
mostly unemployed men and women with family-related interruptions. This
implies that female wages are primarily determined by the women’s attachment
to the labor market.
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Abstract
This paper examines the wage effects of different types of career interruptions.
We consider the timing and duration of non-employment spells by exploiting an
administrative data set of German social security accounts (IAB employment
sample) supplemented with information on the employees’ entire working lives
(IAB supplement sample I). These data allow us to distinguish between
employment breaks due to registered unemployment, formal parental leave,
training or other reasons – a distinction which can only be approximated using
just the IAB employment sample. Our IV fixed effects estimation results suggest
that women’s labor supply is endogenously determined, whereas men’s
employment histories can be treated as exogenous. Career interruptions reduce
the wage rates of both men and women. Moreover, the wage cuts resulting from
unemployment, parental leave and additional home time are larger than the pure
human capital effects of missing experience, hinting at a possible stigmatization
of workers with discontinuous employment histories.
JEL classifications: J22, J24, J31
Keywords: career interruptions, returns to experience, wage differentials, panel
estimation.
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21 Introduction
In most wage estimations job-related human capital is measured by aggregated
labor market experience, that is the amount of time spent in (self-)employment.
However, an increasing number of empirical studies suggests that the pure sum
of years employed does not unveil the whole picture of what determines an
individual’s work experience, because discontinuities in the employment
biography are not explicitly considered. Two people with the same number of
years worked may still differ in the frequency of career interruptions.
Employment breaks – be they due to childbearing, childrearing, further training,
unemployment, illness/disability, or any other out-of-the-labor-force periods –
are likely to generate wage effects, presumably mainly negative ones. As a
result, discontinuities in the employment pattern do not only imply interruptions
in the accumulation of human capital, but possibly a deterioration of the human
capital stock in the sequel. In this case, not only the duration, but also the timing
of the career interruptions matters. Due to the neglect of these peculiarities in an
individual’s employment biography, empirical evidence points to the fact that
conventional specifications underestimate the return to experience, in particular
during the first years of an individual’s career (see e.g. Light and Ureta 1995,
Murphy and Welch 1990).
One reason why the interruption of employment may not be wage-neutral refers
to technical and organizational progress and innovations in the work process.
Human capital acquired in previous years of employment may become obsolete
after an interruption, if this specific knowledge is not maintained and updated
during absence. In the economic literature, the decay of human capital has been
neglected for a long time. The effect of employment breaks on earnings was first
investigated by Mincer and Polachek (1974) for women in the U.S.. From
simple OLS regressions, they conclude that wage cuts due to periods out of
work can be attributed to an interruption in the accumulation of human capital as
well as a depreciation or atrophy of the human capital stock built up in the past.
However, these results are at risk of being biased, because unobserved worker
characteristics are expected to be correlated with both intermittent labor force
participation and wages.
A number of studies tackle this problem by estimating fixed-effects models
using panel data (Mincer and Polachek 1987, Mincer and Ofek 1982, Sundt
1987 as well as Licht and Steiner 1991). More recent analyses on the impact of
career interruptions are provided by Kim and Polachek (1994), Light and Ureta
(1995), Ferber and Waldfogel (1998) as well as Ureta and Welch (2001) using
US data, Gupta and Smith (2000) for Denmark and Albrecht et al. (1999) for
Sweden. The impact of employment breaks on the income profile of German
women has been investigated among others by Galler (1991), Gerlach (1987),
Licht and Steiner (1992), Kunze (2002), Ondrich et al. (2001) and Beblo and
3Wolf (2000, 2002). Whereas Gupta and Smith simply use the presence and
number of children as a proxy for employment interruptions, Kim and Polachek
introduce the number of years spent not working as a home-time variable in the
wage equation. After controlling for individual heterogeneity and endogeneity of
home time they detect skill atrophy. Licht and Steiner find a catch-up effect of
wages following a break that partly offsets the depreciation of human capital.
Galler, who considers also the sequence of full-time and part-time periods,
observes these wage catch ups only for formerly part-time employees who take
up a full-time position again. Full-time experience gathered prior to a break has
a weaker impact on the wage rate than that following a discontinuity. Gerlach
(1987) found that wages of German women fall with the length of time spent on
the job prior to the first leave, using work experience and employment breaks at
different points in life as explanatory variables. That is, the wage penalty is most
pronounced for later breaks when a higher amount of human capital has already
been accumulated, which is then at risk to depreciate. The impact of the exact
timing of interruptions in Germany has been investigated explicitly in our
preceding study (Beblo and Wolf 2000), where we estimate the depreciation rate
on work experience due to non-work and part-time spells in an extension of the
Mincer wage equation. A shortcoming of this approach, however, is that the
limited number of observations compelled us to impose strong restrictions on
the functional form of the human capital depreciation process. Nevertheless, the
implications of our specification are consistent with the empirical results of
Gerlach (1987).
Light and Ureta (1995) account for intermittency in the work history in the most
flexible way. In their wage equation, they include a set of variables that measure
the fraction of time worked during each year of a career. They also draw special
attention to the timing of interruptions. A major drawback of this very flexible
specification, however, is the large number of parameters to be estimated,
because this requires a large number of observations. A second shortcoming is
that they do not distinguish between the impacts of different types of career
interruptions. But there are good reasons to believe that the specific cause of the
break may influence the size of the wage penalty. Since participation in
vocational training programs is generally much lower among unemployed or
young mothers, skill obsolescence may be particularly relevant for these groups.
Other reasons for wage penalties to depend on the type of career interruption are
potential stigma or signaling effects. Several studies point to the fact that past
unemployment spells evoke negative expectations on the side of the employer
regarding the productivity of the potential employee. As a consequence,
unemployed may be offered lower wages, everything else being equal. Albrecht
et al. (1999) argue that parents who take a long employment break after the birth
of a child may also be stigmatized as being less motivated and hence less
productive.
4To date, hardly anything is known about the long-run wage effects of different
types of employment breaks. Does, for example, a one-year maternity leave
cause the same wage cut as an unemployment spell or a sabbatical? And what
kind of training yields higher returns, full-time education in school or learning-
by-doing on the job? Taking up these open questions, Kunze (2002)
distinguishes between four types of career interruptions, namely unemployment,
parental leave or national service and other non-work, using German data. She
finds large differences in losses across the variety of career interruptions. Also
Albrecht et al. (1999) distinguish various types of career breaks and find
different impacts of formal parental leave and additional home care on
subsequent labor income. They conclude that the negative wage effect cannot
only be attributed to the depreciation of human capital but is also driven by the
signal of lacking career orientation.
The aim of our paper is to shed more light on the wage effects of different types
of employment breaks of German men and women. Following Light and Ureta’s
work history specification, we consider the impact of each single year of an
individual’s career. The work history model is advantageous to conventional
specifications of the wage equation by measuring experience more precisely and
by imposing less constraints on the shape of the wage-experience profile. We go
beyond Light and Ureta in two different respects: As Kunze, we distinguish
between several types of non-employment. But in contrast to both studies, we do
not only take into account the timing but also the duration of each interruption
by calculating the exact length of each employment and non-employment spell.
Following Light and Ureta, we consider the endogeneity of individual
employment decisions throughout the life cycle by applying the instrumental
variable approach following Hausman and Taylor (1981) within a fixed-effects
panel estimation to quantify the wage penalties of different career interruptions.
We are able to identify time out of work by exploiting extensive and detailed
information of individuals’ biographies since the beginning of their careers. This
information stems from a data set of German social security accounts (IAB
employment sample) supplemented with additional administrative data on the
individuals’ entire working lives.
The paper proceeds as follows: After a description of the data and our sample
chosen we illustrate the relevance of different types of career interruptions for
women and men. We then present some theoretical considerations regarding the
diverse impacts of different types of employment breaks. The estimation
procedure is presented in Section 5. Panel estimation results for female and male
wages then provide the empirical answers. The last section concludes.
52 Data set and description
The individual information underlying our research is based on the IAB
employment sample and additional administrative data assembled at the state
pension authorities. The IAB employment sample is a 1 percent random sample
of German social security accounts that is available for empirical researchers at
the Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung IAB) in Nürnberg (see also Bender et al. 2000). These data
cover the period between 1975 and 1995, that is, every person who was
employed for at least one day from 1975 to 1995 and/or with claims to pension
benefits is included in the parent population.1 During this time, social security
contributions were mandatory for all employees who earned more than a lower
earnings limit. Civil servants, self employed and people with so-called marginal
jobs, that is, jobs with less than 15 hours per week or temporary jobs which last
6 weeks at most, are not covered by this sample.
Altogether, the employment sample represents about 80 percent of all West
German employees and provides very precise information about each
individual’s average daily wage rate. If the wage rate exceeds the upper earnings
limit (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”), the daily social security threshold is
reported instead. 2 Note that the daily wage rate is therefore censored from above
and truncated from below. The available wage information refers to employment
spells that employers report to the Federal Employment Service.3 In this study,
we use the wage information of those employment spells that include June 30th
as the relevant day of each year between 1990 and 1995, that is, we have an
unbalanced panel including six waves of subsequent years.
In order to have more details about non-employment spells, we supplemented
the employment sample with data from the same administrative process
generating the data, the IAB employment supplement sample I. This supplement
sample provides information about the individuals’ entire working lives and
allows us to distinguish between different types of “non-working” periods,
                                          
1 These are people who, as employees, have paid contributions to the pension system or who
have been covered by the pension system through contributions by the unemployment
insurance or by being a parent (depending on the birth year of the child, a fixed number of
years is counted as child caring time during which the non-working parent becomes
entitled to receive pension benefits).
2 Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2000) show that this affects particularly the wage rate of
high-skilled employees. According to their results, about 50 percent of high-skilled men
earn wages above the upper earnings limit. Among high-skilled full-time females, this
share amounts to at least 20 percent.
3 To deal with the problem of overlapping spells, we apply a hierarchical order of activities
where employment trumps all other activities.
6namely, unemployment, formal parental leave, illness, disability, care for other
people, full-time education, military or civil service and simple out-of-the-labor-
force spells. Such a distinction can only be approximated with the IAB
employment sample. To our knowledge, there is no other large-sample
longitudinal data set providing as much and detailed information on individuals’
employment histories in Germany. Moreover, as we use administrative data, our
results do not rely on self-reported or retrospective wages and biography
information. Due to the large number of observations and due to the most
accurate and precise information about individual biographies and wage rates,
these panel data are very suitable for a comprehensive and exceptionally
detailed analysis of heterogeneous employment patterns and wages.4
For the purpose of our analysis, we defined four types of non-employment
spells. The first category, formal parental leave, accounts for employment
breaks due to the birth of a child. These spells include the mandatory
employment break of 14 weeks (maternity protection) prescribed by the German
law, that is aimed at protecting working pregnant women and mothers of new-
born babies, as well as the additional months of parental leave that parents are
entitled to by the prevailing law. Non-employment spells due to unemployment
are summarized in the second group. A third category captures time spent in
school or vocational training. It also includes military service or, alternatively,
civil service. All remaining activities other than being employed, such as illness
(only if it exceeds 6 weeks), disability or care for other family members
including children, are generally not associated with the accumulation of job-
related human capital. We define them as out-of-the-labor-force periods. The
remaining days of each year which are not reported in the social security records
are also added to this category. Since no information is available on the reasons
of such drop outs from the records, we cannot prevent that periods of self-
employment, marginal employment as well as the temporary status as a civil
servant are also treated as work interruptions. Taking into account that these
activities are usually associated with human capital accumulation then implies
that we are rather underestimating the wage effects of real out-of-the-labor-force
periods.
To make sure that the observed non-employment periods truly represent
interruptions of the employment biography, we have to identify the starting date
of each individual’s career. Therefore, we define the beginning of the career as
soon as the individual has been reported in employment (and covered by social
                                          
4 For a comparative analysis of the employment penalties for motherhood in West Germany
after 1945 see Kohlmann, Bender and Lang (2002).
7security) for at least five months during one year.5 Any spells before the start of
the career are ignored. That is, all activity shares performed prior to the first
employment enter the wage regression with value zero. Since our current sample
provides information about the employment history of the past 23 years, we
exclude individuals older than 40 years, so as to have observations for
everybody since the very beginning of his or her career. We restrict the analysis
to those who are full-time employed at the cross-section dates (June 30th) of the
years 1990 to 1995, although sensitivity analyses are performed for part-time
working women as well. We limit our analysis to West Germans, since large
parts of the human capital stocks accumulated by East Germans before 1990
seem to have become obsolete due to the German reunification (Puhani and
Steiner, 1997). As a consequence, employment breaks at the time of the socialist
regime in East Germany are likely to be less relevant for the wage rate obtained
in a market economy.6
In addition to the process-dependent censoring and truncation of the data we
chose to trim daily wages at the highest and lowest percentile in order to exclude
remaining outliers. The resulting average gross daily wage rate of men is 82.8
Euro and 63.9 Euro for women. Since part-time employees are excluded from
the sample, this difference cannot be attributed to differences in the number of
working hours. Apart from differences in qualification and sectoral segregation,
this wage gap may be partly due to differences in human capital accumulated on
the job. In our sample of individuals aged between 19 and 40 years, men have
worked 8.2 years on average, whereas women spent 6.7 years in gainful
employment.
3 The occurrence of unemployment, formal parental
leave and other employment interruptions over the
early life cycle
Figures 1 and 2 display the average activity patterns of women and men below
age 40 once their career has started. We have chosen the average employment
biographies of a 40-year old woman and a 40-year old man. For any given age
the graphs show the percentage time per year spent in employment, formal
maternity/parental leave, unemployment, schooling or other non-employment
                                          
5 In contrast to Light and Ureta (1995), we choose a less restrictive definition of the starting
date of the career, because the employment spells reported in the IAB employment sample
are related to social security contributions, which are in general not mandatory for students
in temporary or second jobs.
6 Moreover, our observation period just covers the beginning of the fundamental transition
process in East Germany when wages were strongly affected by institutional regulations,
making the interpretation of wage differentials even more complex.
8activities. Note that, as these life cycle illustrations are based on samples of
women and men who are employed in either of the years 1990 to 1995, they do
not provide a fully representative picture of the biography of an average German
man or woman of that age.
One of the most striking differences between the patterns of women and men is
that, while gainful employment increases steadily over the life cycle for both
sexes, only women have a more or less constant employment share in their late
20s. Female annual labor force participation starts off at zero percent at the age
of 17, it levels out at some 60 percent from 26 to 30 and rises to above 90
percent at the age of 39, conditional on being employed at age 40. Figure 1
illustrates that formal maternity leave spells of women occur mainly prior to or
during this plateau phase of gainful employment, when they are at the beginning
of their twenties up to age 30. Their small magnitude is due to the parental leave
legislation up to 1979 that allowed a maternity protection period of 14 weeks
only (6 weeks before and 8 weeks after childbirth), which translates into a
maternity share per year of about 27 percent. Additional parental leave of 4
months was not introduced before 1979. It was extended to 10 months in 1986
and gradually increased during the following years. Since 1992 parents of a
newborn child had the right to interrupt work for a period of three years while
they are guaranteed the right to return to their previous employer in a status
adequate job. As the majority of our sample already experienced their
parenthood before the 1992 extension of the maximum parental leave period, we
only observe proportions just above 1 percent between age 21 and 30 and a
maximum proportion of 2.2 percent at age 27. That is, the average woman of
this age (including mothers and non-mothers) has spent less than a week in
maternity leave. If we focus our attention on mothers only, the fraction of
maternity leave averages at approximately 40 percent of a year (= 21 weeks).
The proportion of women in further education, on the contrary, is rather small
and can be neglected particularly in the early and late years of the career.
Female unemployment plays an increasing role with rising age, although it is
highest at age 33 and 34 with above 3 percent. There may be two explanations
for this finding. First, job changes that are accompanied by search
unemployment are likely to occur more frequently around this age and, second,
these unemployment spells may be associated with or following a maternity
leave.
9Figure 1: Employment and employment breaks over the early life cycle of women
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Age
Ti
m
e 
pe
r y
ea
r s
pe
nt
 ..
.
out of the labor force
in further education
unemployed
on parental leave
employed
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employment, formal maternity/parental leave, unemployment, further education or other non-
employment activities once the career has started.
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-1995 of 40-
year-old women, own calculations.
Figure 2: Employment and non-employment states over the early life cycle of men
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Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-1995 of 40-
year-old men, own calculations.
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After considering employment, unemployment, schooling and parental leave,
any remaining work interruption of each year is attributed to activities out of the
labor force. As mentioned above, these include all states that are not associated
with the accumulation of marketable human capital, such as illness, disability or
care for other family members including children. Between age 25 and 35 out-
of-the-labor-force periods take up about 20 percent of an average woman’s year.
Naturally, the importance of this status diminishes in the sequel as the graphs are
conditioned on women being currently employed.
Male employment increases monotonically with age and levels out above 90
percent from age 35 onwards. Contrary to the female picture, we observe a sharp
drop at age 19 caused by compulsory military or civil service. According to our
definition this status is included in the training category. Apart from this feature,
further education and non-employment spells both decrease with age, whereas
unemployment periods only seem to be relevant from the middle of the twenties
(with a maximum level around 3 percent at age 31 to 33). We do not observe
any family–related pattern in the men’s figure. Formal parental leave, though
applying also to fathers since 1992, is of such minor importance that we cannot
even distinguish the respective area in Figure 2.
4 Why distinguish between career interruptions?
The various non-employment activities described above are likely to influence
the sign and the size of the resulting wage penalty. As re-schooling or
participation in training programs during the career are supposed to increase an
individual’s human capital stock, we would expect positive wage effects of these
periods. It remains unclear, however, to which extent further training activities
pay off later on compared to learning-by-doing on the job.
During an employment break different forces are at work that may result in
future wage cuts. In principle, one can distinguish between missing experience,
human capital decay and additional, productivity-related effects. Productivity-
related effects may either reflect an actual drop in productivity or may be
attributed to a stigma imposed by the demand side of the labor market. Apart
from missing experience – which is the same for all breaks – the other wage-
cutting factors possibly differ by the type of career interruption.
During unemployment or family-related career interruptions, for example, skill
obsolescence may be especially harming. Human capital decay is a particular
risk also for employees whose work is affected by rapid technological progress
(e.g. jobs in the ICT sector). In addition to human capital decay, stigma or
signaling effects may cause further wage cuts for re-employed. Due to
asymmetric information potential employers may interpret past non-employment
as a taint. Particularly the pool of displaced workers may be seen as less
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productive on average than other groups on the job market, such as new entrants
to the labor force or voluntary job changers. Gibbons and Katz (1991), for
instance, show that unemployed who have been laid off are offered lower wages
because the dismissal is interpreted as a signal of low productivity by
prospective employers, that is they are stigmatized.7 Other empirical studies also
point to the fact that past unemployment spells evoke negative expectations on
the side of the employer regarding the productivity of the potential employee
(Berkovitch 1990). As a consequence, unemployed may be offered lower wages,
everything else being equal.
Voluntary non-employment may be interpreted as a “bad” signal as well such
that the resulting wage cut goes beyond mere human capital depreciation. There
are various reasons. First, individual productivity is lower on return due to lower
flexibility in working time. This argument is most relevant for mothers and
anyone with caring responsibilities. Second, the individual decision of a woman
or a man to take “time out” without being registered unemployed is interpreted
as a lack of career commitment by future employers. For this reason, we may
also expect different wage impacts from formal parental leave and additional
time out of work. A woman who returns to work right after or before the end of
her formal leave period is more likely to be seen as a job-oriented employee. A
woman who extends her child-related break beyond the legal time frame, on the
contrary, may be judged as primarily being a mother who spends less time and
less effort on her career.
However, there is less evidence concerning the stigma effects of parental leave
and other out-of-the-labor-force periods. For Sweden, Albrecht et al. (1999) find
that men face higher wage reductions than women subsequent to parental leave
and household time from which they deduce that the signaling function of
discontinuous employment profiles with respect to the individual’s career
orientation hits men in particular. In Germany, only indirect evidence on the
potential stigma of being a housewife or househusband is available. In a recent
survey, about 3000 mothers were asked whether their male partners had called
on (part of) the 3-year formal parental leave as well as for their assessment of
the reasons if they had not (see Beckmann 2001). Among the reasons, the men’s
fear of being stigmatized by superiors and colleagues seemed to be of minor
importance. We would therefore expect to find smaller effects of voluntary non-
employment periods on male wages in Germany than in Sweden.
                                          
7 Gibbons and Katz compare the post-displacement wages of laid-off workers and those who
have been displaced in a plant closing and find a higher average wage loss for the first
group. As the market infers a lower productivity for laid offs whereas no such inference
exists for closed-down employees their results can be interpreted as a stigma effect of lay
offs.
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5 Estimation procedure
To quantify the long-run wage penalties associated with intermittent labor force
participation and to identify possible stigma or signaling effects of
unemployment, formal parental leave or out-of-the-labor-force periods, we run
wage estimations that consider all these activities performed over the life cycle.
For this purpose, we apply a work history model first introduced by Light and
Ureta (1995) to assess the returns to experience and the wage effects of different
employment discontinuities. In order to fully characterize past work experience,
they construct an array of variables measuring the fraction of time worked
during each year of the career. This set of experience variables is included in the
wage equation, together with a set of dummy variables that are supposed to
capture the wage effects of non-active spells.
We extend their model by allowing for different types of non-employment.
Furthermore, we exploit precise information about the duration of all
employment or non-employment states. That is, instead of dummy variables we
construct a set of share variables for each activity. Being employed and four
non-employment states – that is, unemployment, formal parental leave, further
education and out of the labor force – are measured by the fraction of time spent
in the specific status during each year of the past career. As a consequence, our
wage model is able to capture both, individual differences in the timing of
employment and specific non-employment periods as well as variations in the
amount of human capital accumulated on the job and the duration of non-
employment states.8 The mean values of all share variables and other
explanatory variables used in the regressions are reported in Table 1 and 2 in the
Appendix.
We specify three different models. All three models use complete information
about the past 20 years of an individual’s career.9 Model 1 is a simple OLS
version of the work history model using pooled data. This estimation may,
however, suffer from the potential correlation between unobserved individual
effects and some explanatory variables. To control for unobserved heterogeneity
among individuals, Model 2 applies a fixed effects estimation procedure. In
view of a possible endogeneity of the individual employment pattern, Model 3
takes up the instrumental variable approach suggested by Hausman and Taylor
(1981). In this last specification all activity shares are instrumented to account
                                          
8 Multi-collinearity is circumvented because all share variables only become relevant if non-
employment spells occurred during the years after the start of a career. The reference group
is thus formed by entrants into the labor market.
9 Since we focus on activities after the start of a career, activity shares referring to 21 to 23
years ago turned out negligible.
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for the correlation of intermittent labor force participation and other unobserved
worker characteristics.
The general specification of the wage equation nesting the three models
described above can be written as follows:
(1)
20 20 20
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1 1
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where the dependent variable ln itW  is the logarithm of the average gross daily
wage rate deflated with the consumer-price-index of person i at time t
( 1990,...,1995)t . The vector iY  denotes all time-invariant variables, such as
education level and job status.10 itX represent the explanatory variables that vary
over the observation period for each individual. t jEMP  is the set of variables
describing the employment history of the past j years ( 1 20)j   . Accordingly,
t jUE   denotes the unemployment history, t jEDU   represents time spent in
further education, t jPL   describes the use of parental leave and t jOLF   captures
periods out-of-the-labor-force. Information from the past 10 years enter as
annual variables, whereas data referring to the past 11 to 20 years are aggregated
into a single variable.11 The individual effects i  capture wage differentials due
to unobserved characteristics. Finally, we have a transitory component it ,
which is assumed to be homoscedastic with mean zero.
If the individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, a random
effects panel estimation will yield inconsistent results.12 In Model 2 and 3 we
therefore apply a fixed effects approach to estimate the coefficients in equation
(1). One drawback of this procedure is that it does not allow to determine the
effects of time-invariant variables. Secondly, the within-group estimator is not
                                          
10 As these variables are time-constant, they have to be excluded from the simple fixed
effects estimation.
11 We also run estimations including different variables for all of the past 20 years. But since
the coefficients do not differ significantly from year 11 onwards, we decided to aggregate
them in our final specification to keep things as simple as possible.
12 We applied a Hausman specification test to check the appropriateness of the random-
effects estimator. As expected, the hypothesis that the differences in (the subset of)
coefficients between the fixed effects and the random effects model are not systematic can
be rejected.
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fully efficient since it ignores variations across individuals in the sample.
Thirdly, the endogeneity of the individual employment pattern is not taken into
account adequately. An alternative approach suggested by Hausman and Taylor
(1981) is based on the assumption that certain explanatory variables ( itX  and/or
the activity shares) or at least specific transformations of these variables are not
correlated with the individual fixed effects i  and can therefore serve as
instruments for the endogenous variables (e.g. the work history variables).
Hausman and Taylor assume that deviations from the individual means of (all)
time-varying variables are not correlated with i  and produce unbiased
estimates of  . The underlying idea of this approach is that, while the overall
level of, for instance, employment is likely to be correlated with the unobserved
individual effects, the year-to-year variation of this status is not. In other words,
every person has a preference for being employed or taking time out of work
that is reflected in the (endogenously determined) individual means of these
variables. The annual deviations from these overall levels, that is the exact
timing of employment breaks, are then considered as exogenous shocks.13
Hausman and Taylor furthermore illustrate that the individual means of other
explanatory variables in itX , which are not correlated with i , provide valid
instruments for those variables which are correlated with i . Applying this
approach to the work history model allows us to estimate the returns to diverse
employment patterns, taking into account unobserved heterogeneity and the
endogeneity of past experience.
In our specification, the time-invariant exogenous variables include the year of
birth, education level and the industry sector of each individual, whereas the
observation year and firm size are taken as time-variant exogenous variables.
Hence, the richness of our data set allows us to use both individual means and
deviations from individual means (where applicable) as instruments for the
endogenous work history variables, the activity shares, and the endogenous
time-invariant variables. The inclusion of time-constant covariates makes sure
that the rank conditions are satisfied. Since our main focus is on the wage effects
of discontinuous employment patterns, we confine ourselves to instrumenting
the job status (white collar) as the only time-invariant variable in Model 3.
                                          
13 One may argue that the Hausman and Taylor approach does not lead to the identification of
the parameters of interest, because the current level of employment may be correlated with
past shocks. Our point is that an event at one point of time (e.g. the birth of a child) does
not necessarily affect an individual’s annual deviations from mean employment, because
this event is already accommodated in the average employment level of that person,
representing the individual’s preference for work.
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6 Estimation results
We run separate regressions for men and women. Due to the minor role of
parental leave among men, we combine out-of-the-labor-force and formal
parental leave into one set of share variables. The estimation results of Models 1
to 3 are displayed in Tables 3 to 8 in the Appendix, where Table 3 and 4 refer to
the pooled OLS wage regression for men and women respectively, Tables 5 and
6 to the fixed effects panel regression and Tables 7 and 8 present the fixed
effects specification with instrumented activity shares and job status. Note that
our definition of the activity shares (taking values above zero only for activities
after the start of the career) implies that all coefficient estimates have to be
interpreted with reference to wage rates of new entrants into the labor market.
We will first draw our attention to the estimated returns to experience. The
results clearly indicate that, for both men and women, job experience that has
been accumulated several years ago contributes less to the current income than
recent employment spells. The most striking difference between the three
models estimated is that the returns for time spent working decrease step by step
from Model 1 to Model 3. This is true for both men and women. Also the T-
statistics vary remarkably between specifications.14 The OLS estimates provide
by far the largest coefficients for past employment experience (see Figure 3).
While a man’s wage increases by about 10 percent if he has worked during the
preceding year, the respective female wage is only about 8 percent higher than
that of a comparable labor market entrant. Over the whole work history,
however, marginal returns are more or less the same for women and men.
Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity (Model 2) results in lower estimated
returns to experience. Hence, the OLS regression is overestimating the true
returns to experience due to unobserved heterogeneity among wage earners. If
we contrast the estimation results of Model 2 and Model 3, it becomes apparent
that both fixed effects equations (with or without instrumented activity shares)
yield similar coefficients for men, whereas the regressions for women differ
quite substantially by specification. It seems that men’s work histories are
appropriately treated as being exogenous, for instance determined by social
roles.
Estimates for female returns to experience are much lower when we take into
account that career breaks, that is intermissions  in labor force participation, may
be endogenously determined. Table 8 shows that employment spells that took
place more than three years ago have no significant effect on the current wage
rate. This finding hints at selectivity effects. The lower returns to past
experience in the instrumental variable estimation indicate that female workers
                                          
14 Standard deviations for Model 3 are generated by bootstrapping with 200 iterations.
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with a high wage potential anticipate their higher returns and self-select into the
group of women who are more attached to the labor market and have less career
interruptions.
Figure 3: Returns to past employment experience
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Note: The wage premium is defined as the quotient of the predicted wage rate for a person who has
been working during the past 1, 2, . . ., 20 years relative to the wage rate of a comparable labor market
entrant.
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own
calculations based on the estimation results of Model 1 to 3.
From Tables 3 to 8 we see that past involvement in further education does not
seem to have a statistically significant effect on the current wage rate according
to the OLS estimates. Though a positive impact becomes apparent as soon as
unobserved individual heterogeneity is captured through individual fixed effects
(see Model 2). If we also account for endogeneity of individual employment
patterns, the results confirm the significant positive effect of education spells for
men’s earnings (Model 3). For women, the wage effect becomes insignificant if
training took place more than 3 years ago. Remember that all estimation results
have to be interpreted with respect to the reference group of new entrants into
the labor market. That is, the wage rate of a woman who was engaged in further
education several years ago does not differ from the wage rate of a woman who
has just entered the labor market but with otherwise same characteristics.
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The wage effects of formal parental leave relative to out-of-the-labor-force
periods also differ quite substantially across specifications. In the pooled
regression parental leave spells are negatively correlated with a woman’s wage
rate while in the fixed-effects estimation of Model 2 the influence vanishes. In
contrast, the wage penalty caused by out-of-the-labor-force periods becomes
much more pronounced when unobserved heterogeneity is accommodated. This
points to a selection effect in the way that mothers (who are identified by a
parental leave spell because the included mother protection period is mandatory
for all mothers) are over-represented among low-paid workers – be it because
they sort themselves into these jobs ex ante, because they cope with these jobs
after childbirth in exchange for more family-friendly working conditions,
because of actual productivity effects or due to a stigma effect at work. The lack
of statistical significance of wage cuts due to parental leave still holds in Model
3. Having been on formal parental leave does not impair a woman’s wage
growth on average, whereas out-of-the-labor-force spells significantly decrease
her future wage rate compared to someone just starting the career. It is
noticeable that for men, no such effects can be observed in cases of “voluntary”
non-employment while registered unemployment causes wage losses,
particularly if having occurred during the last 2 years.
Figure 4: Wage effects of a one-year break for men
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Note: The wage ratio is defined as the quotient of the predicted wage rate after a one-year break that
happened a given number of years ago relative to the wage rate of a continuously employed man.
Black symbols indicate a statistically significant wage effect of the respective break compared to being
employed in the same year at the 5-percent significance level (deviations from the horizontal line at 1).
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own
calculations based on the estimation results of Model 3.
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In the following, we confine our analysis to the estimation results of Model 3 as
we think it represents the most appropriate specification at hand. Figures 4 and 5
illustrate the wage ratio of the predicted wage rate after a one-year break that
happened a given number of years ago relative to the wage rate of a
continuously employed man or woman. The curves with the squared symbols
describe the hypothetical wage penalty caused by the mere lack of experience.
We refer to this as the missing experience effect. The vertical difference
between this curve and all other lines demonstrates the additional wage effect of
the specific non-employment activities. Black symbols indicate non-
employment activities which lead to statistically significant wage cuts (or
premiums), meaning that the wage ratio of the interrupter and the continuously
employed worker is statistically different from one. Transparent symbols reflect
that the wage ratio does not differ significantly from one. In this sense, the
representation chosen in Figure 4 and 5 differs from that of Figure 3 and Tables
3 to 8 as we now compare our estimated wage effects with respect to
continuously employed workers instead of job entrants.
It turns out once more that for men any experience of unemployment or out-of-
the-labor-force during the past 20 years yields a lower wage rate than gainful
employment. The biggest wage cut stems from unemployment, in particular very
recent unemployment spells. Again this wage decrease can be decomposed in
two factors. The first one is due to missing experience, which is the same for all
types of employment breaks. The remaining wage differential may be
interpreted as a stigma effect associated with unemployment. An alternative
explanation would be a lower average productivity level of formerly
unemployed compared to other break groups. To conclude whether one of the
non-employment spells evokes significant wage effects in addition to the
missing experience effect, we compare the absolute values of the employment
coefficients with the respective set of non-employment coefficients. In the case
of unemployment, this test reveals a statistically significant difference between
the two coefficients, that is unemployment causes negative wage effects in
addition to the lost return to experience. It is noticeable, however, that male
wages catch up fairly quickly after re-employment. If unemployment took place
more than 4 years ago, the additional effect on the current wage rate is not
significant for the most part. In this case, the wage cut of about 3 percent can
almost fully be attributed to the missing job-experience. Another interesting
finding is that those men who have been out of the labor force also suffer a wage
reduction. Although the difference between the missing-experience curve and
the out-of-the-labor-force curve seems rather negligible from purely graphical
inspection, it proves significant in a statistical sense.
A very intuitive result is that the wage ratio of men in further education remains
constantly above the other curves. Provided that the training was completed
more than 2 years ago, schooling yields even higher returns than learning-by-
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doing on the job. But if participation in a training program has taken place very
recently, the accompanying human capital effects can only partly compensate
the wage reductions due to missing experience. Learning-by-doing on the job
still seems more beneficial in this case.
Figure 5: Wage effects of a one-year break for women
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Note: The wage ratio is defined as the quotient of the predicted wage rate after a one-year break that
happened a given number of years ago relative to the wage rate of a continuously employed woman.
Black symbols indicate a statistically significant wage effect of the respective break compared to being
employed in the same year at the 5-percent level (deviation from 1 in the graph).
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own
calculations based on the estimation results of Model 3.
The financial consequences of employment discontinuities are even more
pronounced for women, as apparent from the wider spreading of curves in
Figure 5. Unemployment, formal maternity leave as well as employment breaks
due to out-of-the-labor-force periods all cause severe wage penalties. In the case
of parental leave and additional home-staying these penalties are significantly
larger than the pure wage effects due to missing job experience. Contrary to
unemployment, there may be a signaling effect accompanied with these types of
non-employment. This result is particularly striking as the endogeneity of
intermittent labor force participation has been taken into account. Interestingly
enough formal parental leave spells only result in a statistically significant
additional wage cut if they occurred more than 5 years ago. This implies that
there is no catch-up effect. Also the impact of out-of-the-labor-force periods
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does not seem to level out over time. Even women who stayed out of the labor
market more than 10 years ago have to accept significant wage cuts compared to
continuously employed women. One explanation may be the relatively long job
protection phase of 3 years (from 1992) that guarantees a status-adequate job
with the same pay for mothers returning to their former employers. Hence short-
run consequences of parental leave are ruled out. Since a large number of
mothers does not return directly to the labor market after the end of formal
maternity leave, the resulting wage losses only become apparent after these
women enter the labor market again, which may not happen before the child has
reached school age. Although the analyses presented are based on samples of
full-time employed women and men only, we are quite confident that our
conclusions concerning the evaluation of the parental leave legislation in
Germany apply to all women who are employed at some point in time after child
birth.15 We run several sensitivity analyses – based on a sample including also
part-time employed women – and added a dummy variable for working less than
half of standard hours and another dummy for working half-time or more hours.
The estimation results confirm the wage-reducing effect of out-of-the-labor-
force periods, as opposed to unemployment presented above (see the estimation
results displayed in Table 9 in the Appendix).
Another interesting finding is that for women, even more than for men, human
capital accumulated in training programs pays off better than learning-by-doing
on the job. The attendance of a training course or further education immediately
results in a statistically significant wage gain. The education curve fluctuates
around an average of 1.1. That is to say that the wage rate of a woman who was
enrolled in education compared to the wage of an employed woman in that same
year is about 10 percent higher, no matter when the schooling activity took
place.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we analyze the wage effects of different types of employment
breaks for German men and women. Following Light and Ureta’s work history
specification we consider the impact of each single year of an individual’s career
on the wage rate. The work history model is advantageous to conventional
specifications of the wage equation, because it allows to measure the impact of
experience more precisely and imposes less constraints on the shape of the
wage-experience profile. We go beyond Light and Ureta in two different
                                          
15 In fact, many mothers in Germany start off with part-time jobs when returning to work
after childbirth and increase work hours only gradually. These women are included in our
estimation sample as soon as they have taken up full-time employment (again). Past part-
time employment is of course considered as work experience.
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respects: First, we distinguish between different types of non-employment
spells. Second, we do not only take into account the timing but also the duration
of each interruption. We perform fixed-effects panel estimations with
instrumented labor force intermissions to quantify the wage penalties of
different career interruptions.
The results clearly show that, for both men and women, job experience that has
been accumulated several years ago contributes less to the current income level
than recent employment spells. Allowing for unobserved individual
heterogeneity and endogeneity of the work history results in lower estimated
returns to experience, particularly for women. Furthermore, we can show that
the wage penalties of discontinuous employment biographies are very different,
in sign and in size, for women and men. While men’s wages seem to be
negatively affected by unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force experience in
particular, wage cuts for women are mainly caused by parental leave and out-of-
the-labor-force spells even if they occurred several years ago. Our estimation
procedure allows us to disentangle the overall wage cut into two components,
the missing experience effects and an additional productivity-related effect,
possibly caused by signaling or a stigma imposed by employers. We find that
productivity or stigma effects associated with unemployment seem to apply
mostly to men whereas women are rather stigmatized by family-related
interruptions. Training, on the contrary, generates positive wage effects for both
women and men.
Our results more or less tally with the findings of other German studies: Ondrich
et al. (2001) estimate a reduction in wage growth of 18 percent per year of
maternity leave. In accordance with our results they find that staying home after
the end of the formal leave period has an even bigger effect on women’s wage
incomes. Being out of the labor force for only half a year will lower annual
wage growth by an additional 15 percent. According to Kunze (2002) , the wage
loss for women’s wages due to parental leave amounts to 13 to 18 percent per
year, depending on the time elapsed since. Although based on the IAB
employment sample as well, her estimation results point to a substantially lower
wage cut due to residual non-work than ours. There may be various reasons for
these differing results. First, Kunze uses a different samples (she restricts herself
to 17 to 36 year olds with apprenticeship training at the most whereas we use
every person between 17 and 40 in the employment sample). Secondly, the
methodologies applied are different (fixed-effects versus IV fixed-effects). And
finally, we use a more precise definition of non-work spells due to additional
information on non-work activities available only in the IAB supplement
sample.
From our results we conclude that for female wages it is primarily the
attachment to the labor market that counts. Even women with unemployment
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experience suffer significantly lower wage penalties than those who stayed out
of the labor force for a while. One policy implication resulting from our analyses
may then be to get young mothers back to work earlier – right after the end of
formal parental leave at the latest. However, one obstacle that prevents women
from returning to their jobs in Germany is often seen in the lack of child care
facilities, particularly all-day child care. But as we found in a previous study
(Beblo and Wolf 2000), even taking up a part-time employment helps to reduce
the wage cut substantially.
There are several directions in which our analysis shall be extended. One
interesting extension would be the differentiation between industry sectors.16 In
particular we should investigate the difference in wage penalties for workers of
more traditional sectors and those working in the information and
communication technology where skill obsolescence is expected to be most
severe.
                                          
16 The occupation level does not seem to matter with respect to the returns to experience. In a
further sensitivity analysis we focussed on high-skill job holders only. The estimated
returns to experience and effects of career interruptions did not differ from those of the
overall sample.
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the male sample
Employment Unemployment Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
sharet-1 .9012 .2300 .0170 .0944 .0193 .1039 .0133 .1005 Firm size (number of employees)
sharet-2 .8371 .3288 .0205 .1089 .0255 .1295 .0177 .1145 <20 .2982 .4575
sharet-3 .7809 .3763 .0220 .1128 .0287 .1403 .0181 .1162 20 .0613 .2398
sharet-4 .7232 .4114 .0233 .1158 .0310 .1470 .0179 .1156 50 .0925 .2897
sharet-5 .6648 .4371 .0250 .1193 .0315 .1495 .0175 .1142 100 .0693 .2540
sharet-6 .6069 .4551 .0264 .1221 .0310 .1500 .0177 .1152 500 .1640 .3703
sharet-7 .5504 .4650 .0276 .1253 .0301 .1484 .0181 .1167 1000 .0645 .2457
sharet-8 .4983 .4685 .0256 .1203 .0292 .1461 .0178 .1157 >1000 .1491 .3562
sharet-9 .4482 .4671 .0221 .1116 .0279 .1431 .0181 .1168 Year
sharet-10 .4001 .4613 .0182 .1012 .0264 .1400 .0184 .1178 1990 .1584 .3651
sharet-11 .3550 .4511 .0138 .0877 .0250 .1365 .0179 .1161 1991 .1631 .3694
sharet-12 .3108 .4363 .0097 .0719 .0235 .1315 .0177 .1157 1992 .1653 .3715
sharet-13 .2684 .4173 .0058 .0524 .0218 .1266 .0174 .1148 1993 .1658 .3719
sharet-14 .2256 .3926 .0039 .0400 .0198 .1215 .0176 .1154 1994 .1672 .3731
sharet-15 .1832 .3617 .0033 .0362 .0182 .1171 .0171 .1136 1995 .1803 .3844
sharet-16 .1453 .3276 .0026 .0319 .0163 .1109 .0165 .1115 Job status
sharet-17 .1125 .2909 .0019 .0279 .0134 .1007 .0158 .1090 Blue coll. .6352 .4814
sharet-18 .0822 .2498 .0012 .0220 .0110 .0924 .0154 .1081 White coll. .3648 .4814
sharet-19 .0581 .2094 .0006 .0161 .0083 .0812 .0131 .1003 Endogenous variable (in DM)
sharet-20 .0432 .1826 .0003 .0106 .0045 .0591 .0065 .0716 wage rate 162.03 44.53
# of observations 143553
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations.
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the female sample
Employment Unemployment Parental leave Out-of-labor-force Education Other control variables
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
sharet-1 .8723 .2805 .0155 .0916 .0018 .0338 .0353 .1547 .0027 .0470 Firm size (number of empl.)
sharet-2 .7668 .3827 .0189 .1082 .0031 .0434 .0505 .1937 .0040 .0590 <20 .3038 .4599
sharet-3 .6760 .4330 .0191 .1096 .0043 .0507 .0578 .2097 .0039 .0589 20 .0631 .2431
sharet-4 .5941 .4592 .0189 .1093 .0053 .0567 .0619 .2179 .0030 .0524 50 .0849 .2787
sharet-5 .5227 .4705 .0185 .1078 .0062 .0609 .0624 .2204 .0013 .0343 100 .0702 .2555
sharet-6 .4584 .4721 .0177 .1060 .0059 .0589 .0618 .2214 .0013 .0339 500 .1664 .3725
sharet-7 .4024 .4664 .0175 .1065 .0058 .0574 .0597 .2186 .0012 .0330 1000 .0593 .2362
sharet-8 .3568 .4570 .0147 .0976 .0057 .0555 .0567 .2134 .0012 .0327 >1000 .0962 .2949
sharet-9 .3173 .4447 .0121 .0882 .0055 .0530 .0530 .2065 .0011 .0317 Year
sharet-10 .2823 .4308 .0094 .0775 .0060 .0551 .0485 .1976 .0010 .0300 1990 .1424 .3495
sharet-11 .2521 .4158 .0068 .0652 .0060 .0547 .0433 .1861 .0009 .0278 1991 .1518 .3589
sharet-12 .2242 .3994 .0048 .0539 .0057 .0533 .0377 .1733 .0007 .0242 1992 .1610 .3675
sharet-13 .1983 .3817 .0028 .0379 .0051 .0516 .0319 .1584 .0006 .0219 1993 .1700 .3757
sharet-14 .1717 .3605 .0025 .0356 .0042 .0478 .0266 .1446 .0004 .0190 1994 .1784 .3829
sharet-15 .1447 .3359 .0022 .0329 .0033 .0423 .0213 .1295 .0004 .0168 1995 .1963 0.3972
sharet-16 .1198 .3097 .0020 .0315 .0025 .0373 .0163 .1119 .0004 .0169 Job status
sharet-17 .0972 .2813 .0016 .0283 .0019 .0324 .0116 .0939 .0003 .0153 Blue coll. .2096 .4070
sharet-18 .0749 .2484 .0010 .0215 .0015 .0295 .0083 .0790 .0002 .0125 White coll. .7903 .4071
sharet-19 .0544 .2121 .0005 .0156 .0010 .0252 .0053 .0635 .0001 .0089 Endogenous variable (in DM)
sharet-20 .0361 .1719 .0002 .0091 .0005 .0172 .0027 .0438 .0000 .0054 wage rate 125.17 43.48
# of observations 74561
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations.
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Appendix Table 3: OLS wage equation for men (Model 1)
Employment Unemployment Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
sharet-1 .1001 15.21 -.0679 -6.16 -.0475 -4.04 .0372 4.23 Firm size (ref. < 20 employees)
sharet-2 .0438 6.64 -.0429 -3.84 .0010 0.10 .0020 0.23 20 -.0171 -6.18
sharet-3 .0364 5.71 -.0258 -2.38 -.0118 -1.11 .0004 0.04 50 .0135 6.07
sharet-4 .0288 4.54 -.0232 -2.21 -.0055 -0.52 .0034 -0.39 100 .0340 13.66
sharet-5 .0283 4.39 -.0177 -1.69 .0081 0.77 .0114 1.30 500 .0520 29.92
sharet-6 .0243 3.68 -.0170 -1.63 -.0034 -0.32 .0093 1.03 1000 .0790 35.43
sharet-7 .0146 2.20 -.0263 -2.60 .0031 0.29 .0016 0.18 >1000 .1321 81.20
sharet-8 .0224 3.45 -.0132 -1.33 .0070 0.66 .0080 0.90 Constant 4.6956 1064.88
sharet-9 .0164 2.64 -.0108 -1.08 -.0049 -0.47 .0057 0.67 Year (ref. 1995)
sharet-10 .0189 4.34 -.0157 -1.81 .0032 0.41 .0036 0.56 1990 -.0173 -7.94
sharet-11 20 .0051 15.16 -.0321 -9.58 .0024 2.35 .0011 0.85 1991 .0027 1.25
1992 .0147 6.92
1993 .0028 1.34
1994 -.0060 -2.81
# of observations 143,553
Adj  R² 0.3725
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations. Additional control variables include education
level and job status. Robust standard errors (White-Huber).
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Appendix Table 4: OLS wage equation for women (Model 1)
Employment Unemployment Parental leave Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
sharet-1 .0790 9.31 -.0556 -2.99 -.2039 -3.68 -.0786 -4.69 .0282 1.08 Firm size (ref. < 20 empl.)
sharet-2 .0394 4.52 -.0205 -1.14 -.3140 -7.08 -.0635 -3.81 .0324 1.45 20 -.0052 -0.96
sharet-3 .0484 5.39 -.0126 -0.69 -.2506 -6.19 -.0196 -1.17 .0032 0.13 50 .0337 7.69
sharet-4 .0347 3.66 -.0195 -1.06 -.2967 -8.16 -.0379 -2.18 -.0286 -0.96 100 .0886 21.20
sharet-5 .0317 3.06 -.0174 -0.90 -.2562 -7.35 -.0127 -0.69 .1222 2.26 500 .1539 52.79
sharet-6 .0232 2.08 -.0236 -1.16 -.2568 -7.38 -.0213 -1.11 .0351 0.47 1000 .2054 52.76
sharet-7 .0191 1.56 -.0140 -0.67 -.2778 -8.11 -.0242 -1.19 -.0432 -0.51 >1000 .2587 78.36
sharet-8 .0082 0.61 -.0092 -0.41 -.3046 -8.41 -.0210 -0.99 .0107 0.12 Constant 4.3270 660.94
sharet-9 .0335 2.42 -.0106 -0.43 -.2079 -5.35 .0109 0.51 .0716 0.77 Year (ref. 1995)
sharet-10 .0003 0.03 -.0544 -2.34 -.1938 -5.40 -.0136 -0.77 -.0130 -0.15 1990 -.0410 -10.07
sharet-11-20 .0019 2.37 -.0264 -2.69 -.0921 -8.43 -.0012 -0.52 .0629 5.24 1991 -.0174 -4.33
1992 .0090 2.31
1993 .0015 0.39
1994 -.0080 -2.14
# of observations 74,561
Adj  R² 0.3441
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations. Additional control variables include education
level and job status. Robust standard errors (White-Huber).
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Appendix Table 5: Fixed effects wage equation for men (Model 2)
Employment Unemployment Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
sharet-1 .0805 23.74 -.0178 -3.30 .0008 0.16 .0677 12.75 Firm size (ref. < 20 employees)
sharet-2 .0295 9.01 -.0170 -3.16 .0109 2.14 .0350 6.87 20 .0053 2.56
sharet-3 .0303 9.15 .0043 0.77 .0051 0.97 .0379 7.17 50 .0159 7.97
sharet-4 .0238 7.26 -.0007 -0.14 .0023 0.43 .0351 6.39 100 .0273 12.24
sharet-5 .0202 6.10 -.0031 -0.56 .0057 1.06 .0375 6.57 500 .0425 22.13
sharet-6 .0167 4.98 -.0044 -0.80 -.0023 -0.43 .0405 6.97 1000 .0547 20.97
sharet-7 .0080 2.35 -.0159 -2.88 -.0010 -0.18 .0390 6.60 >1000 .0732 28.41
sharet-8 .0146 4.28 -.0066 -1.19 .0068 1.22 .0440 7.31 Constant 4.8477 235
sharet-9 .0073 2.16 -.0077 -1.35 -.0064 -1.14 .0429 7.09 Year (ref. 1995)
sharet-10 .0167 5.98 -.0059 -1.10 .0029 0.59 .0529 9.52 1990 -.0591 -6.83
sharet-11-20 .0015 0.82 -.0246 -6.02 -.0048 -1.41 .0378 7.67 1991 -.0307 -4.40
1992 -.0106 -2.00
1993 -.0153 -4.23
1994 -.0175 -8.84
# of observations 143,553
# of groups 32,057
within-group R² 0.1744
Corr. (µi * Xb) 0.0940
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations.
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Appendix Table 6: Fixed effects wage equation for women (Model 2)
Employment Unemployment Parental leave Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
sharet-1 .0656 11.16 -.0088 -0.92 -.0062 -0.20 -.0856 -11.07 .1424 8.09 Firm size (ref. < 20 employees)
sharet-2 .0377 6.88 .0047 0.51 -.0152 -0.53 -.0583 -7.85 .1194 7.44 20 .0041 1.18
sharet-3 .0353 6.15 .0102 1.05  -.0026 -0.09 -.0618 -7.96 .1070 6.54 50 .0335 9.40
sharet-4 .0243 4.16 .0003 0.03 -.0221 -0.78 -.0603 -7.50 .0820 4.51 100 .0533 13.66
sharet-5 .0215 3.57 .0146 1.43 -.0279 -0.98 -.0546 -6.48 .1501 4.15 500 .0793 23.88
sharet-6 .0147 2.35 .0088 0.84 -.0351 -1.22 -.0553 -6.38 .0969 2.59 1000 .0928 19.43
sharet-7 .0093 1.42 .0184 1.71 -.0483 -1.66 -.0674 -7.44 .0661 1.60 >1000 .1024 21.38
sharet-8 .0067 0.99 .0116 1.05 -.0532 -1.79 -.0754 -8.08 .1174 2.87 Constant 4.6650 121
sharet-9 .0104 1.51 .0116 1.01 -.0457 -1.52 -.0664 -6.98 .1011 2.34 Year (ref. 1995)
sharet-10 -.0001 -0.02 .0155 1.37 -.0383 -1.28 -.0797 -9.42 .0826 2.16 1990 -.0989 -5.23
sharet-11-20 -.0043 -1.11 .0062 0.67 -.0249 -0.87 -.0708 -12.51 .0586 2.85 1991 -.0627 -4.12
1992 -.0271 -2.36
1993 -.0221 -2.86
1994 -.0201 -4.88
# of observations 74,561
# of groups 19,132
within-group R² 0.2054
Corr. (µi * Xb) -0.1308
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations.
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Appendix Table 7: IV fixed effects wage equation for men (Model 3)
Employment Unemployment Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
sharet-1  .0793 14.84 -.0259 -2.58 -.0016 -.15 .0649 8.03 Firm size (ref. < 20 employees)
sharet-2 .0289 5.72 -.0255 -2.43  .0059  .63 .0337 4.42 20 .0049 1.35
sharet-3 .0299 7.00 -.0052 -.56  .0001  .01 .0361 4.12 50  .0144 4.20
sharet-4 .0230 5.22 -.0092 -1.01 -.0019 -.18 .0327 3.92 100 .0254 6.79
sharet-5 .0193 3.90 -.0108 -1.12  .0019  .20 .0348 3.64 500  .0423 12.24
sharet-6 .0154 3.58 -.0118 -1.33 -.0065 -.67 .0361 4.18 1000 .0564 13.89
sharet-7 .0074 1.86 -.0221 -2.67 -.0046 -.49 .0351 3.97 >1000 .0746 17.12
sharet-8 .0135 3.68 -.0138 -1.50  .0016  .17 .0396 4.18 Constant 4.8238 163.64
sharet-9 .0064 1.70 -.0141 -1.61 -.0113 -1.17 .0382  4.07 Year (ref. 1995)
sharet-10 .0155 4.36 -.0134 -1.43 -.0017 -.20 .0481 4.93 1990 -.0602 -5.61
sharet-11-20  .0005 .27 -.0299 -3.80 -.0088 -1.14 .0338 3.48 1991 -.0318 -3.75
1992 -.0116 -1.79
1993 -.0162 -3.65
1994 -.0180 -7.71
Job status (ref. blue collar)
White coll. .1010 5.60
# of observations 143,553
# of groups 32,057
within-group R² 0.1751
Corr. (µi * Xb) 0.2361
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations. All activity shares and the dummy variable for
white collar workers are retrieved by instrumental variable estimation. Standard deviations are generated by bootstrapping.
32
Appendix Table 8: IV fixed effects wage equation for women (Model 3)
Employment Unemployment Parental leave Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
sharet-1  .0582 5.52 -.0141 -.63 -.0179 -.23 -.0929 -4.63 .1395 3.35 Firm size (ref. < 20 employees)
sharet-2 .0312 2.85 .0009  .05 -.0255 -.36 -.0644 -4.11 .1176 2.91 20 .0043 .62
sharet-3 .0283  2.77  .0060  .32 -.0141 -.21 -.0685 -3.81 .1045 2.70 50 .0341  4.46
sharet-4 .0175  1.56 -.0041 -.22 -.0333 -.48 -.0666 -3.50 .0798 1.74 100 .0535  7.15
sharet-5 .0149  1.37  .0103  .53 -.0389 -.55 -.0608 -3.25 .1510 .85 500 .0789  11.59
sharet-6 .0079  .64  .0046  .21 -.0464 -.64 -.0619 -3.00 .0952 .63 1000 .0923  10.96
sharet-7  .0025  .23  .0143  .69 -.0596 -.83 -.0742 -3.62 .0650 .26 >1000 .1016  10.59
sharet-8 -.0001 -.01  .0076  .37 -.0644 -.82 -.0818 -3.95 .1153 .50 Constant 4.7646 25.24
sharet-9 .0034  .27  .0073  .35 -.0574 -.73 -.0733 -3.44 .1011 .36 Year (ref. 1995)
sharet-10 -.0068 -.66  .0114  .48 -.0499 -.60 -.0858 -3.95 .0824 .47 1990 -.1333 -2.82
sharet-11-20 -.0113 -1.16  .0016  .08 -.0376 -.47 -.0780 -4.72 .0574 .26 1991 -.0901 -2.37
1992 -.0477 -1.69
1993 -.0358 -1.87
1994 -.0269 -2.78
Job status (ref. blue collar)
White coll. -.0396 -.30
# of observations 74,561
# of groups 19,132
within-group R² 0.2064
Corr. (µi * Xb) -0.1038
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations. All activity shares and the dummy variable for
white collar workers are retrieved by instrumental variable estimation. Standard deviations are generated by bootstrapping.
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Appendix Table 9: IV fixed effects wage equation for women, full-time and part-time (Model 3)
Employment Unemployment Parental leave Out-of-the-labor-force Education Other control variables
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat.
sharet-1 .0777 9.57 -.0195 -.96 -.0542 -.91 -.0779 -5.46 .1510 3.26 Firm size (ref. < 20 employees)
sharet-2 .0435 5.99 .0104 .59 -.0890 -1.73 -.0490 -3.73 .1302 3.47 20 .0145 2.13
sharet-3 .0469 6.49 .0120 .62 -.0690 -1.27 -.0461 -3.54 .1188 2.78 50 .0428 5.49
sharet-4 .0305 3.67 .0068 .35 -.0686 -1.27 -.0520 -3.70 .0974 2.09 100 .0624 7.45
sharet-5 .0245 2.98 .0177 .95 -.0578 -1.06 -.0450 -2.95 .1756 1.08 500 .0918 13.50
sharet-6 .0197 2.20 .0085 .43 -.0660 -1.24 -.0547 -3.36 .1276 .69 1000 .1102 11.45
sharet-7 .0135 1.48 .0217 1.02 -.0714 -1.20 -.0603 -3.55 .1169 .56 >1000 .1111 12.53
sharet-8 .0113 1.08 .0196 .87 -.0648 -1.14 -.0577 -3.18 .1581 .63 Constant 4.5632 103.44
sharet-9 .0152 1.45 .0109 .47 -.0550 -.86 -.0556 -3.44 .1303 .34 Year (ref. 1995)
sharet-10 .0068 .74 .0187 .79 -.0540 -.87 -.0605 -3.32 .1374 .64 1990 -.0622 -2.85
sharet-11-20 .0021 .45 .0103 .53 -.0293 -.47 -.0509 -5.20 .1110 .59 1991 -.0316 -1.81
1992 -.0032 -.24
1993 -.0053 -.58
1994 -.0127 -2.62
Job status (ref. full time)
Part time 1 -.7230 -29.03
Part time 2 -.2289 -31.05
# of observations 95,467
# of groups 23,452
within-group R² 0.3106
Corr. (µi * Xb) 0.1109
Source: Matched IAB employment sample and supplement sample I, cross sections 1990-95, own calculations. Part time 1 indicates working less than half of
standard hours, part time 2 working half-time or more hours All activity shares and the dummy variables for part-time workers are retrieved by instrumental
variable estimation. Standard deviations are generated by bootstrapping.
